Gate 1
Threat and data boundary
Name the data owner, evaluator, key holder, secret inputs, permitted outputs, metadata exposure, plaintext endpoints, attackers, trust assumptions, retention, and release authority.
Independent encrypted-inference gate
Homomorphic Encryption AI Readiness
Describe one private-inference workload, its threat model, compiler path, cryptographic scheme, backend, keys, accuracy, performance, and operating plan. Generate a checklist without treating an encrypted demo as a security or production certification.
Four readiness gates
Gate 2
Program and cryptography
Pin the model or function, supported operations, shapes, secret annotations, scheme, backend, parameters, security level, error or noise budget, key lifecycle, and independent reviewer.
Gate 3
Compiler and evidence
Record HEIR, rules, backend, compiler, platform, input IR, flags, generated code, SBOM, licenses, plaintext oracle, accuracy fixtures, security tests, and reproducible build.
Gate 4
Service and recovery
Measure end-to-end latency, throughput, memory, ciphertext size, concurrency, failures, retries, quotas, logs, patch ownership, canary, rollback, incident response, support, and exit path.
Classify the evidence
Ready for compiler evaluation
A small supported function has a plaintext oracle, pinned toolchain, local keys, synthetic data, explicit accuracy limits, and no production dependency.
Ready for bounded pilot
Cryptographic and application reviews pass; generated code, keys, privacy boundary, end-to-end performance, failure recovery, support, and output release are validated.
Not ready
The workflow depends on an unfinished frontend, testing-only binary, unsupported backend, unreviewed parameters, demo latency, unclear keys, or an unverifiable privacy claim.
Minimum acceptance evidence
Reproduce a pinned build; compare encrypted and plaintext results across representative, boundary, malformed, and precision-sensitive inputs; review scheme parameters and generated code; measure the full client-to-service path under load; test key loss, wrong keys, corruption, timeout, retry, replay, rollback, dependency patching, and unauthorized output release. Keep real sensitive data out of the evaluation until the privacy design is approved.
Review the HEIR decision path
HEIR and private AIUnderstand the compiler layers, supported backends, and system boundary.OpenFHE and Lattigo workflowCompare Bazel rules, Python, and direct compiler integration.Production limitationsTurn maturity, performance, keys, security, and support into gates.
Official facts checked August 19, 2026 against Google Security Blog, HEIR documentation, and the google/heir repository. Recheck toolchain, schemes, backends, releases, security guidance, issues, licenses, and support status.
Frequently Asked Questions
It creates a review checklist from the workload, threat model, data, scheme, backend, compiler, keys, accuracy, performance, operations, and support facts you provide. It does not compile a model, inspect code, choose secure parameters, or certify privacy.
The source guides focus on HEIR, but the gates cover any encrypted-inference design. Record the exact compiler and backend rather than assuming controls transfer between toolchains.
No. It proves one path ran. Production evidence also needs cryptographic review, representative accuracy, full latency and capacity, key management, metadata boundaries, generated-code review, operations, recovery, and support.
HEIR documentation says nightly binaries are intended for testing compiler passes and not for production use. Build and qualify a pinned toolchain under your release process.
No. The official repository disclaims that status. Assign internal ownership for qualification, patches, incidents, support, and migration.